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Caps on Capsules: Prescription for Lower Drug
Prices in the United States
CHRISTINE CHASSE*

ABSTRACT
The United States is the foremost innovator of pharmaceutical therapies in the
world. That innovation, however, comes at a price—literally. Americans pay more for
their medications than any other country. In a country without universal healthcare,
the topics of economics, human rights, and healthcare intersect at the crossroads of
pharmaceutical pricing. In contrast to most other countries, the United States has no
regulations on pharmaceutical price control. One major argument against government
regulation is its inherent opposition to the free market system: the heart of the
American economy. Further still is the argument that profit restriction would create a
chilling effect on the industry, stifling the pharmaceutical industry’s cutting-edge (but
expensive) innovations and jeopardizing the United States’ leading position in the
global pharmaceutical industry. The most basic argument for profit control is to
prevent pharmaceutical price monopolization so Americans can afford the care
prescribed to them. This Comment summarizes some of the unique issues in the
pharmaceutical industry, major arguments for and against profit control, and the
current climate in United States’ politics and laws regarding this issue for a possible
solution. Proposed solutions herein include policy changes to enhance Medicare’s
ability to negotiate drug prices with manufacturers, limiting drug companies’ ability
to raise prices without confines or explanation, and making reimbursement contingent
on drug performance to ensure that new medications provide measurable benefits. This
multipronged approach would not only make medications more affordable, but it
would also increase the quality of new formularies.

I.

INTRODUCTION

The United States is arguably the world leader in both pharmaceutical development
and innovation.1 For example, the United States is credited with 43.7% of all new
molecular entities (NMEs) developed between 1992 and 2004 out of all other inventor
countries.2 The United States also tops the list for having the world’s highest drug
*
JD Candidate, Texas A&M University School of Law, May 2021. The author is a registered nurse
and has both a bachelor’s degree and a Master of Science in nursing from the University of Texas at
Arlington. She wishes to thank Professors Srividhya Ragavan and Lynne Rambo for their encouragement
and guidance; Andrea Ordonez, Katherine Bernales, Olivia Countryman, and especially the student editors
at Georgetown University, including Joe Thomas, for their editing assistance; and her spouse Jing and their
children, Sonia and Orion, for their love and patience.

1 See ROSS C. DEVOL, ARMEN BEDROUSSIAN & BENJAMIN YEO, MILKEN INST., THE GLOBAL
BIOMEDICAL INDUSTRY, 6 (2011).
2 Salomeh Keyhani, Steven Wang, Paul Hebert, Daniel Carpenter & Gerard Anderson, US
Pharmaceutical Innovation in an International Context, 100 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1075, 1075 (2010).
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prices. On average, medications sold in the United States cost fifty percent more than
in other developed countries.3 Are these two concepts in tandem? Economists estimate
that if the United States had adopted European-style price controls on medications
during the 1990s–early 2000s, it would have produced 117 fewer NMEs.4 The nation’s
success in the pharmaceutical industry is attributed to an array of influences, including
world-class universities, research centers, and scientists, as well as groundbreaking
business leadership.5 These elements are not, of course, exclusive to the United States.
However, there is one major factor that is exclusive: the government’s commitment to
the free market system. This includes the conspicuous absence of artificial limitations
(i.e., government regulations) on profits pharmaceutical companies reap.6
The United States government and pharmaceutical industries have targeted other
nations as part of the reason for the lack of American drug price controls. For example,
former United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) Commissioner, Dr. Mark
McClellan, in his speech in the first-ever international colloquium on generic
medicine, broadly stated that the United States shoulders most of the costs in
developing new drugs worldwide.7 He further elaborated that “some of the world’s
richest nations are driving the world’s hardest bargains” because they are only paying
to produce drugs that the United States developed.8 He then suggested that richer
countries need to shoulder related expenses to research and development of new drugs
in proportion to their income.9
Dr. McClellan implies that the United States’ domestic market is paying for the
development of innovative new drugs. From this logic stems the belief that
medications need freedom from governmental price controls so that the pharma
industry can recoup their expenses associated with research and development. Foreign
pharmaceutical companies seem to agree. While other countries are more frugal with
pharmaceutical purchasing by utilizing a variety of price controls, discussed infra,
foreign drug manufacturers take advantage of the lack of American price controls. The
United States is veritably their profit haven, where they sell their products for higher
prices to make up for price controls at home.10 Even though Americans consume
roughly the same amounts of medications as citizens in other countries11 (and most

3 US Price Gouging in the Pharmaceutical Industry, IHS MARKIT (2018), https://ihsmarkit.com/
solutions/us-price-gouging-pharmaceutical-industry.html [https://perma.cc/WY3D-HXTP].
4 Joseph Golec & John A. Vernon, Financial Effects of Pharmaceutical Price Regulation on R&D
Spending by EU versus US Firms, 28(8) PHARMACOECONOMICS 615, 624–25 (2010).
5

See generally DEVOL ET AL., supra note 1.

6

See id. at 32, 34.

7

See Janice Kopkins Tanne, FDA Chief Wants Other Rich Countries to Share Drug Development
Costs, 327 BRITISH MED. J 830, 830 (2003).
8

Id.

9

Id.

10

See Alaric Dearment, How Much Will Drug Price Controls Harm Innovation? It Depends,
MEDCITY NEWS (Feb. 19, 2020), https://medcitynews.com/2020/02/how-much-will-drug-price-controlsharm-innovation-it-depends/ [https://perma.cc/4JTS-3QT2].
11 See, e.g., Dana O. Sarnak, David Squires & Shawn Bishop, Paying for Prescription Drugs Around
the World: Why Is the US an Outlier?, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND (Oct. 5, 2017),
https://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/issue-briefs/2017/oct/paying-prescription-drugs-aroundworld-why-us-outlier [https://perma.cc/8L3L-X6PL]; Phill O’Neill & John Sussex, International
Comparison of Medicines Usage: Quantitative Analysis from a Swedish Perspective, OFFICE OF HEALTH
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certainly does not have the highest population), American consumers account for
nearly half to seventy percent of all global pharmaceutical profits.12
The United States spends more on health care than all other Organisation for
Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) countries.13 The United States
spends nearly three times per capita what the United Kingdom (UK) does, and five
times per capita what Canada does—and these countries have universal healthcare for
all of their citizens.14 In a February 2019 health tracking poll, the Kaiser Family
Foundation found that while most Americans (fifty-eight percent) believe prescription
medicine has made their lives better, nearly eighty percent of Americans polled said
the cost was “unreasonable.”15 About one in four people surveyed reported difficulty
in paying for their medications, and thirty percent say that they have not taken their
medications as prescribed due to cost.16 Only twenty-five percent of survey
participants believe that pharmaceutical companies actually price their medications
fairly.17
Drug prices are not regulated in the United States. Any legal basis for taking action
against excessive drug prices must be linked to a violation of established antitrust
law.18 So although raising the price of a drug is not considered illegal conduct on its
own, dramatic price increases have been a catalyst for increased government inquiry.
For example, in 2016, there was public outrage over the sudden, 500% price increase
of EpiPens, the injectable form of epinephrine.19 The drug’s manufacturer, Mylan,
publicly confirmed that it received an information request from the Federal Trade
ECONOMICS 15 (Apr. 2015), https://www.ohe.org/publications/international-comparison-medicines-usagequantitative-analysis-swedish-perspective# [https://perma.cc/V4XM-3D43].
12 Exact estimates depend on the sources cited. See, e.g., David Belk, Composite Analysis of the
Finances for Thirteen of the World’s Largest Pharmaceutical Companies from 2011-2018, TRUE COST OF
3,
https://truecostofhealthcare.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Totals-for-All.pdf
HEALTHCARE
[https://perma.cc/44GE-PW5T] (last accessed Aug. 29, 2020); COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS, REFORMING
BIOPHARMACEUTICAL PRICING AT HOME AND ABROAD (Feb. 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2017/11/CEA-Rx-White-Paper-Final2.pdf [https://perma.cc/V6AC-J4PZ].
13 It is estimated that the United States spent 16.9% of their GDP on health care in 2018. See Roosa
Tikkanen & Melinda K. Abrams, U.S. Health Care from a Global Perspective, 2019: Higher Spending,
Worse
Outcomes?
THE
COMMONWEALTH
FUND
(Jan.
30,
2020),
https://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/issue-briefs/2020/jan/us-health-care-global-perspective2019 [https://perma.cc/K7TM-4B8V].
14 See David U. Himmelstein, Terry Campbell & Steffie Woolhandler, Health Care Administrative
Costs in the United States and Canada, 2017, ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 134–42 (2020), https://www.acp
journals.org/doi/10.7326/M19-2818 [https://perma.cc/3P22-68X6].
15 See Ashley Kirzinger, Lunna Lopes, Bryan Wu & Mollyann Brodie, KFF Health Tracking Poll February 2019: Prescription Drugs, KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION (Mar. 1, 2019), https://www.kff.org/
health-costs/poll-finding/kff-health-tracking-poll-february-2019-prescription-drugs/
[https://perma.cc/4CSG-SJYS].
16

Id.

17

Id.

18

Harry First, Excessive Drug Pricing as an Antitrust Violation, AM. ANTITRUST INST. (Jan. 19,
2019), https://www.antitrustinstitute.org/work-product/excessive-drug-pricing-as-an-antitrust-violation/#:
~:text=Harry%20First’s%20%
E2%80%9CExcessive%20Drug%20Pricing,82%20Antitrust%20Law%20Journal%20No.&text=Although
%20high%20pharmaceutical%20drug%20prices,are%20the%20result%20of%20collusion [https://perma
.cc/D7HZ-DLCE].
19 Epinephrine is used to treat emergency conditions, such as life-threatening allergic reactions like
anaphylaxis (throat swelling compromising the airway and one’s ability to breathe).

2020

CAPS ON CAPSULES

283

Commission regarding possible antitrust violations.20 In October that year, Mylan
agreed to pay a $465 million USD settlement with the United States Department of
Justice to settle claims that the company overbilled Medicaid.21 As of the time of
writing, Mylan continues to deny wrongdoing.22
The pharmaceutical market is unique and complicated. The Mylan case helps
illustrate a distinct feature that deviates from standard, textbook models of competitive
markets: “Merit goods,” i.e., goods that should be available to all on the basis of some
concept of need, rather than a basis of ability and willingness to pay.23 As with other
merit goods, pharmaceutical pricing cannot be completely left to the market. This is
the veritable recipe for a monopoly: companies are free to raise prices until profits
decline. Medications weigh on public budgets, which is another reason why the
government should intervene in the competition process.
This Comment argues that the United States government should institute policy
changes to enhance their ability to negotiate drug prices with manufacturers, limit drug
companies’ ability to raise prices without confines or explanation, and make
reimbursement contingent on drug performance to ensure that new medications
actually provide measurable benefits. Arguably, this triple-pronged approach would
not only make medications sold in the United States more affordable, it would also
increase the quality of new formularies.
This Comment is structured as follows. Section II is about determining the value of
medicines. This includes an examination of the pharmaceutical industry’s research and
development burdens, the industry’s economic market, and a discussion on what
degrees of innovation new medications offer. Section III discusses the interplay
between third party payors and the taxpayers in the United States. Section IV examines
the international realm and how foreign countries balance pharmaceutical innovation
and affordability. Section V reviews examples of U.S. legislation, both current and
prospective-facing, as well as how some general competition law and policy
framework for enforcement against excessive high prices. Section VI describes the
potential downsides of curbing pharmaceutical prices at home, and Section VII
discusses the government’s potential role in addressing high prices in pharmaceutical
markets.

II.

DETERMINING THE VALUE OF MEDICATIONS

The prices of many drugs, both novel and old “gold standard” drugs, including
generics, make affordable access difficult to both patients and payors in the United
States. People’s willingness to pay for life-prolonging medications is high, which can
lead to price-demand inelasticity.24 This is particularly true of medications that do not

20 Dan Managan & Meg Tirrel, Mylan Faces Federal Antitrust Investigation in EpiPen Business,
CNBC (Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/01/30/mylan-faces-federal-antitrust-investigation-inepipen-business.html [https://perma.cc/AJ9Z-62XV].
21

Id.

22

Id.

23

Merit Goods, TRIPLE A LEARNING: MICROECONOMICS SL, http://www.sanandres.esc.edu.ar/secon
dary/economics%20packs/microeconomics_sl/page_116.htm [https://perma.cc/U2FL-RP4R] (last accessed
Aug. 30, 2020).
24 ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, COMPETITION ISSUES IN THE
DISTRIBUTION OF PHARMACEUTICALS 2 (2014) [hereinafter OECD 2014].

284

FOOD AND DRUG LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 75

have any viable alternatives.25 Consider Erbitux, a drug used to treat metastatic colon
cancer. The “sticker price” of this medication is $13,329.60 USD for one month of
treatment.26 It is incapable of curing patients; on average, it extends life just seven
weeks.27 Avastin is another colon cancer drug that is not curative.28 On average, it
extends life two to five months. Avastin’s sticker price in 2008 was $90,816 USD for
eighteen weeks’ worth of treatment.29 Medicare covers both of these treatments.30 And
although insurance companies and federal health insurance plans are liable for the
payment of a large percentage of medications, they are limited in controlling
consumption and selection.31 In contrast, the National Institute for Health and Care
Excellence (NICE), the public body of the Department of Health in England, refuses
to pay for Avastin due to its high cost and perceived low value.32
The research and development process is inherently expensive and complicated.
The resultant costs and the pricing structure of the pharmaceutical market are far from
transparent, and there are valid concerns regarding the actual degree and value offered
by costly new drug therapies.33 This section analyzes market factors in the
pharmaceutical industry and what degree of innovation new medications offer.

A. Costs of Research and Development
The main form of competition between the largest pharmaceutical companies is the
creation of new, patented, innovative therapies.34 However, pharma research and
development is expensive and risky. There is an industry saying: “The first pill can
cost more than a billion dollars while the second only costs a dime.”35 Drugs are
expensive to create, and failures are common. In fact, successful development of a
new drug from conception to market takes an average of ten to fifteen years.36 Even
then, nearly ninety percent of all drugs entering clinical trials fail.37 Industry
approximations of research and development costs vary widely, but the most
25

Id.

26

How Much Should I Expect to Pay for Erbitux?, LILLY, https://www.lillypricinginfo.com/erbitux
[https://perma.cc/9YDE-93Q6] (last accessed Aug. 27, 2020).
27

EZEKIEL J. EMANUEL, HEALTHCARE, GUARANTEED 56 (2008).

28

See Tito Fojo & Christine Grady, How Much is Life Worth: Cetuximab, Non-Cell Lung Cancer,
and the $440 Billion Dollar Question, 101 J. NAT’L CANCER INST. 1044, 1044 (2009).
29

See, e.g., EMANUEL, supra note 27, at 56; see also Fojo & Grady, supra note 28, at 1045.

30

This price has started to come down, however (0.7%), in 2020 with the introduction of Pfizer’s
biosimilar, Zirabev. See Stanton Mehr, Bevacizumab ASP Pricing Now Dropping with Biosimilar Entries,
BIOSIMILARS REV. & REP. (Jan. 27, 2020), https://biosimilarsrr.com/2020/01/27/bevacizumab-asp-pricingnow-dropping-with-biosimilar-entries/ [https://perma.cc/4X7N-EVKL]; Cf. EMANUEL, supra note 27, at
56.
31

OECD 2014, supra note 24, at 2.

32

See Ananya Mandal, Avastin (Bevacizumab) Price, NEWS-MEDICAL.NET (Feb. 26, 2019), https://w
ww.news-medical.net/health/Avastin-(Bevacizumab)-Price.aspx [https://perma.cc/C7XA-W45R].
33

Id.

34

ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, COMPETITION AND
REGULATION ISSUES IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 7 (2001) [hereinafter OECD 2001].
35 Preface, in MAKING MEDICINES AFFORDABLE: A NATIONAL IMPERATIVE xviii (Norman R.
Augustine, Guru Madhavan & Sharyl J. Nass, eds., 2018).
36

CLINICAL DEVELOPMENT SUCCESS RATES, BIO INDUSTRY ANALYSIS 8 (2016).

37

See id. at 10.
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commonly accepted estimates, after full adjustment for trial failures, are between $200
million USD and $2.9 billion USD.38
As mentioned supra in this Comment’s opening salvo, it is these staggering upfront
research and development costs that both the former FDA commissioner and the
industry purports to be the major justification of unregulated drug price control. Like
any other for-profit industry, pharmaceutical companies need to generate more income
than they expend in order to remain in business. Drug developers depend on
intellectual property (IP) protection to ensure that the “blockbuster” drugs (i.e., drugs
that net a profit of over $1 billion USD) that make it to market provide returns on all
research and development investments—not only for the innovator drug, but for all of
the failures as well.39 Following this logic, research and development should be the
number one expenditure of pharmaceutical companies, but in reality, it is not. In 2015,
89 out of the top 100 pharmaceutical companies spent more on marketing than they
did on research and development.40 There are billions of dollars left over for pharma
companies once research costs are covered.41
Additionally, pharmaceutical companies receive subsidies from American
taxpayers to offset the costs of research and development,42 which helps insulate
pharmaceutical companies from clinical failures. The National Institutes of Health
(NIH), a division of Health and Human Services (HHS), provided the pharma industry
with more than $100 billion between 2010 and 2016 for research. All 210 drugs
approved by FDA in that timeframe received NIH sponsorship.43 Drug companies also
utilize academic settings to conduct tax-deductible research and development.44 For
instance, more than a third of all new drugs approved by FDA originate from a
university.45 So in essence, American consumers pay for these drugs twice: during
development, and later, consumption.
To examine the return on investment (ROI) on these drugs, the World Health
Organization (WHO) analyzed ninety-nine FDA-approved cancer medications
developed between 1989–2017. Cancer medications were specifically chosen for the

38 WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, PRICING OF CANCER MEDICINES AND ITS IMPACT 27 (2018)
[hereinafter WHO 2018].
39

See generally OECD 2001, supra note 34; see also WHO 2018, supra note 38, at ix.

40

The R&D Smokescreen, INST. FOR HEALTH AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC POLICY 3 (Oct. 20, 2016), http
s://nurses.3cdn.net/e74ab9a3e937fe5646_afm6bh0u9.pdf [https://perma.cc/PU8C-XX5A].
41 See Nancy L. Yu, Zachary Helms & Peter Back, R&D Costs for Pharmaceutical Companies Do
Not Explain Elevated US Drug Prices, HEALTH AFFAIRS: BLOG (Mar. 7, 2017), https://www.healthaffairs.or
g/do/10.1377/hblog20170307.059036/full/ [https://perma.cc/K5Z9-LE5U].
42 See Mariana Mazzucato, How Taxpayers Prop Up Big Pharma, and How to Cap That, L.A. TIMES
(Oct. 27, 2015), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-1027-mazzucato-big-pharma-prices-201
51027-story.html [https://perma.cc/PBH6-D3NY].
43 See Ekaterina Galkina Cleary, Jennifer Beierlein, Navleen Surjit Khanuja, Laura M. McNamee &
Fred D. Ledley, Contribution of NIH Funding to New Drug Approvals 2010–2016, PROC. NAT’L ACAD.
SCI. U.S. AM. (Feb. 12, 2018), https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1715368115 [https://perma.cc/4Q2Y-A3N5].
44 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, DRUG INDUSTRY: PROFITS, RESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT SPENDING, AND MERGER AND ACQUISITION DEALS 15–16 (Nov. 2017), https://www.g
ao.gov/assets/690/688472.pdf https://perma.cc/YLA8-ZV9F].
45 See Eric V. Patridge, Peter C. Gareiss, Michael S. Kinch & Denton W. Hoyer, An Analysis of
Original Research Contributions Toward FDA-Approved Drugs, 20 DRUG DISCOVERY TODAY 1182 (June
22, 2015), https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/26113307/ [https://perma.cc/5C55-44AY].
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high research and development costs, as well as their steep prices.46 The analysis found
that for every $1 USD spent (after full cost adjustments of trial and error, marketing,
and production), the average return rate was $14.50 USD.47 Of the ninety-nine drugs
analyzed, a solid third (thirty-three) ended up being blockbusters.
Many of the medications analyzed in the study continued to generate massive
profits for the drug manufacturers long after patents and market exclusivity rights
expired.48 WHO concluded that the cost of research, development, and production
bears little to no relationship regarding how the pharmaceutical manufacturers set
prices, at least for oncology drugs.49 Pharmaceutical prices, they determined, are set
according to the company’s commercial goals, with a special focus on extracting the
maximum amount a buyer is willing to pay for medicine. It is this pricing approach
that often makes cancer medication unaffordable, preventing the full benefit of the
treatment modalities from being fully appreciated.50
While the industry focus on cancer drugs sounds like a worthy endeavor (cancer is
one of the top killers in the United States),51 it is not without criticism. Like the Avastin
and Erbitux examples supra, many oncologic drugs are not curative; instead, they offer
small, incremental gains (i.e., weeks of life versus a cure) for high prices.52 While there
may be individual benefits to patients and their loved ones, research priorities may be
skewed towards making these expensive, noncurative formularies versus treatments
that are less profitable.53 To make a comparison, antibiotic resistance is an impending
threat, now.54 While there are many kinds of infections, sepsis in particular is another
leading killer in the United States.55 In fact, one in three people who die in American
hospitals are septic.56 Yet, while antibiotics are fairly cheap to create in comparison to
oncology drugs, one source purports only three pharmaceutical companies are
conducting trials on antibiotics.57 Another reports that in 2018, there were only forty-

46

WHO 2018, supra note 38, at vii–ix.

47

Id. at ix.

48

Id. at 108.

49

See id. at xii.

50

See id. at ix.

51

National Center for Health Statistics: Leading Causes of Death, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION (Feb. 6, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/leading-causes-of-death.htm [https://perma.
cc/BQE7-FGPN].
52 Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Big Pharma’s Go-To Defense of Soaring Drug Prices Doesn’t Add Up, THE
ATLANTIC (Mar. 23, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2019/03/drug-prices-high-costresearch-and-development/585253/ [https://perma.cc/P8GS-J5PG].
53

Id.

54

Id.

55

Sepsis is a systemic body infection. Sepsis, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Feb. 14,
2020), https://www.cdc.gov/sepsis/datareports/index.html#:~:text=Each%20year%2C%20at%20least%201.7,in%20a%20hospital%20have%20sepsis [https://perma.cc/R66W-UZGY].
56
57

Id.

See Joe Kennedy, The Link Between Drug Prices and Research on the Next Generation of Cures,
INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND. (Sept. 9, 2019), https://itif.org/publications/2019/09/09/link-betweendrug-prices-and-research-next-generation-cures [https://perma.cc/ZR6W-88TH]. Contra Antibiotics
Currently in Global Clinical Development, THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS (Apr. 15, 2020),
https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/data-visualizations/2014/antibiotics-currently-inclinical-development [https://perma.cc/3E5Z-2PK5].
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one antibiotics in clinical development to combat the threat of a superbug (a bacterial
or viral infection resistant to all known antibiotics).58 Comparatively, there were over
600 oncology drugs in development in 2018. Glibly, this juxtaposition “seems like
profit maximization, not a case of sensible research priorities that reflects value in
preventing and treating disease.”59

B. How Innovative is Innovation?
Innovations are protected through intellectual property (IP) rights (a protection
deemed so important, it is in the U.S. Constitution). Patents serve both to recognize
and reward drug companies for the commercial success of their products.60 Once a
patent expires, the drug company loses the exclusivity for its patent, allowing generic
drugs to enter the market. However, pharmaceutical companies can delay the
expiration of their patents through a process colloquially known as “evergreening.”
The process works like this: right before the expiration of a drug’s patent, the
manufacturer can apply for an extension on the patent by making a slight change to
the molecular structure, changing the drug delivery, or coming up with a new
indication for the medication.61 The rationale for doing so is not for any therapeutic
advantage, but an economic one.62 Evergreening thus stifles innovation by locking
competitors in litigation by the patent holders as new, similar products are introduced.
Consider Lantus, a patent-protected, long-acting insulin manufactured by Parisbased Sanofi. Lantus is one of the “world’s best-selling drugs.”63 Sanofi made over $5
billion USD off of Lantus alone in 2017.64 Lantus is the number one medication
expenditure for Medicaid, and number two for Medicare.65 Total CMS expenditure on
the drug increased 132% between 2012 and 2016.66

58 Antibiotics Currently in Global Clinical Development, The Pew CHARITABLE TRUSTS (Apr. 15,
2020), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/data-visualizations/2014/antibiotics-currentlyin-clinical-development [https://perma.cc/3E5Z-2PK5].
59

Emanuel, supra note 52.

60

Innovation and Intellectual Property, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION (2007),
https://www.wipo.int/ip-outreach/en/ipday/2017/innovation_and_intellectual_property.html [https://perma
.cc/7UZ4-MMWX].
61 Roger Collier, Drug Patents: The Evergreening Problem, CMAJ (June 11, 2013), https://
www.cmaj.ca/content/early/2013/04/29/cmaj.109-4466?versioned=true [https://perma.cc/9QR3-3PRA].
62

Id.

63

Andrew Dunn, Insulin Drugmakers Under Scrutiny for Pricing, Patent Practices, BIOPHARMA
DIVE (Nov. 2, 2018), https://www.biopharmadive.com/news/insulin-drugmakers-under-scrutiny-forpricing-patent-practices/5412
75/#:~:text=Sanofi%20filed%20its%20first%20Lantus,original%20patent%20expired%20in%20201 [http
s://perma.cc/LG7A-KG4C].
64

Id.

65

Drug Spending Information Product Fact Sheet, CTRS. MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (May 15,
2018), https://www.cms.gov/index.php/es/node/52306 [https://perma.cc/224Q-8C2S].
66 Lantus: Overpatented, Overpriced Special Edition, I-MAK 2 (Aug. 2018), http://www.i-mak.org/
wp-content/uploads/2018/10/I-MAK-Lantus-Report-2018-10-30F.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8KC3-W7L]
[hereinafter I-MAK].
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Generally, patents filed after 1995 obtain twenty years of patent protection.67 Sanofi
initially filed their patent for Lantus in the United States in 1994, and the drug was
first approved for sale in 2000.68 Researchers “found that 95% of the total patent
applications (69 out of 74) on Lantus in the U.S. were filed after . . . 2000.”69 Since
then, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USTPO) has continued to grant
evergreening patents on Lantus through 2031—a full thirty-six years after initial
approval.70
Two drug companies with competing products have attempted to market and sell
their own version of long-acting insulin, only to be sued by Sanofi.71 Lilly’s FDA
approval of Basaglar (another long-acting insulin) was contingent on settling their
legal battle with Sanofi.72 While Basaglar’s product launch was delayed an additional
year due to litigation, the insulin was out in the U.S. market December 16, 201573 (it
was already being sold in Europe).74 Basaglar remains Lantus’ only competition in the
United States.75
But how innovative are new drugs? There were forty-eight new drugs approved by
FDA in 2019.76 Of the forty-eight, almost half (forty-four percent) were for rare
diseases and were given orphan status (more on this infra), almost a quarter (eleven)
were for cancer, and ten were biosimilars.77 Biosimilars are created to be similar to an
existing FDA-approved reference product (any differences are not “clinically
meaningful”), so they are not necessarily novel.78 Replication is a phenomenon
following successful inventions, diluting the notion of “innovation.”79 The pharma

67 Drug Patent Life: How Long Do Drug Patents Last?, DRUGPATENTWATCH, https://
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industry invests in (and has been criticized for) developing “follow-on” drugs.80 In the
simplest of terms, these formularies largely duplicate the efficacy of existing
medications.81
The criticism of follow-on drugs stems from the knowledge that if drugs have more
or less the same clinical outcomes as pre-existing drugs, what value do they offer?82
These drugs absorb resources that could have been invested into research and
development, which seems inherently wasteful if they are virtually indistinguishable
from the pioneer drug.83 Additionally, these drugs require money to market. It seems
counterintuitive to funnel additional resources that could have been utilized on
research and development of novel formularies.84 Evidence also suggests that followon drugs do not even significantly reduce the prices of the pioneering drug.85
Some researchers point out that many follow-on drugs are the result of parallel
development rather than imitation.86 For example, if Drug A and Drug B are
concurrently in development, one of them has to reach the finish line first. The primary
benefit of having two similar medications on the market is more options for patients.87
Some patients may have a slightly better clinical outcome from Drug B even though
Drug A is better for most patients.88 The second major benefit of follow-on drugs
would be competitive pricing with pioneer drugs.89 However, in practice, there has not
been any real discernable price differences between pioneer drugs before and after the
introduction of follow-on drugs in the marketplace.90 For example, researchers Lu and
Comaner demonstrated that for every additional competitor in the American pharma
marketplace, the price of drugs only went down, on average, by two percent.91
Paradoxically, Azoulay’s 2002 research identified examples in which the addition of
follow-on drugs in the marketplace actually increased the prices of all of the
competing medications.92

III. ECONOMIC STRESS ON PAYORS AND TAXPAYERS
Third-party payor financing through health insurance or government funds strongly
increases the ability of patients to pay. It should also be noted that most Americans
have health insurance. The presence of health insurance insulates patients from the
80
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true cost of their medications.93 As a result, many patients, as well as their providers,
do not take into account the price of medications when making medical decisions.94 In
turn, this can lead to higher prices.
Strong buyers of care, such as national healthcare systems or large health insurance
companies, should be able to negotiate prices with buyer power. A buyer’s bargaining
power is usually determined by two factors: (1) The ability to walk away from the deal
and (2) the volume of goods they are purchasing.95 For buyers to be able to negotiate
on price, they need attractive alternatives other than the seller.96 In the healthcare
setting, this alternative could be another medication or treatment. The reality is, in the
American healthcare market, alternative options are frequently limited.97
By law, Medicare covers medical treatments that are “reasonable and necessary,”
but no real, formal definition of “reasonable and necessary” exists.98 In lieu of exact
guidance, Medicare traditionally pays for medications approved by FDA.99 FDA
approval is not hinged on how incrementally more effective new medications are on
existing medications. Instead, their approval (and grant of marketing exclusivity) is
determinative on whether or not a drug or device is “safe and effective,” which, in
turn, is usually determined by a drug’s ability to better treat a condition than a placebo
in the drug company’s own clinical trials.100
Basically, for the purposes of FDA, “effectiveness” does not mean that a drug is
“better” than another, or even that the “improvement” in one drug over another is
worth the cost. Rather, it simply means that a particular drug is better than nothing.
Because Medicare cannot negotiate with drug manufacturers (see the Medicare
Modernization Act, infra), Medicare thus ends up paying for expensive medications
without determining whether the added costs actually improve the quality or length of
life.101
Medicare expenditure continues to be a burden on the nation’s coffers. Dr. Ezekiel
Emanuel put it succinctly: “The combination of continued payments for unproven tests
and treatments, fraud, and uncorrected payment problems—along with the baby
boom—threatens to bankrupt [the United States].”102 In 1966, its first year of
operation, Medicare covered 19 million Americans at a cost of $3.3 billion USD—less
than 0.4% of the GDP.103 By 2020, the U.S. government’s insurance programs
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consumed a quarter of the 2019 federal budget ($1.1 trillion USD).104 Prescription
drugs account for nearly $1 USD out of every $5 USD spent from the Medicare
program.105 Overall prescription drug spending in the United States was half a trillion
dollars in 2016 ($477,000,000 USD).106
Take the example of cancer treatment, specifically early stage HER2 positive breast
cancer (a type of breast cancer that represents twenty percent of all cases). A standard
course of treatment is with a drug therapy combination of doxorubicin,
cyclosphosphamide, docetaxel, and trastuzumab. Without insurance, the out-of-pocket
cost in USD would be the equivalent of ten years’ worth of the average salary in India
and South Africa, or nearly two years’ of the average wages in the United States.107
And this estimation is only for the first line drug therapy: this does not include
radiation or surgical treatment modalities, or supportive care like anti-emetics or blood
products for transfusions. All combined, treatment for breast cancer would be
unaffordable for most without health insurance. Even with insurance, patients report
having financial stress to the extent that they may lower the treatment dose, only
partially fill their prescriptions, or forego treatment altogether.108

A. De Facto Monopoly
Despite undeniable advances in pharmaceutical technology, there have been a
number of competition enforcement cases regarding excessive pricing in the
pharmaceutical industry recently. In 2017 alone, over forty-six state attorneys general
brought claims against generic drug manufacturers alleging that they collectively
agreed to raise prices.109
Curiously, the conditions that brought these cases forward also seem to be relatively
common in the pharmaceutical industry.110 According to a September 2018 report
from the American Association of Retired Persons (AARP), during 2016–2017 retail
prices for 267 widely used brand name prescription medication increased another 8.4%
after five straight years of double-digit average annual price increases.111 Additionally,
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brand name drug prices increased four times faster than the general inflation rate in
2017.112
One argument cited against governmental influence on the pharmaceutical
industry’s pricing is that the price itself operates as a device that allows marketplaces
to “self-correct.”113 If a dominant company is earning excessive profits, for example,
this will send a signal to attract new entrants into the industry.114 If a successful new
competitor is likely to enter the market within a reasonable period, then, theoretically,
it would not be reasonable for the government to intervene.115
There are various factors that explain the level prices are set, including the degree
of competition.116 In a standard market, if it is truly competitive, the price of goods
will be set close to cost. With less competition in the marketplace, prices tend to be
higher.117 One way to benchmark excessive pricing is a comparison of a similar
product in the industry, known as the “competitive price.”118 But how does one define
the competitive price in a market that is not competitive? Another benchmark is the
cost of production.119 But what about companies such as drug manufacturers who
create a number of different products? Taken together, these questions create
difficulties that create risks when trying to enforce price control.120 If the government
were to over-intervene, the pharma industry argues, then it would create a chilling
effect on new market entrants, thus reducing competition.121
MIT researchers Lu and Comaner studied competition in the pharma industry,
specifically, follow-on drugs and their effects on competitive pricing.122 Follow-on
drugs typically compete with the innovator drug because they treat the same
condition.123 As discussed supra, Lu and Comaner concluded that each additional
competitor reduces the price of the drug by two percent.124 However, the average
number of competitors for each drug in their data was about three or four, “which
seems to suggest that the effect of going from [a] pure monopoly to four
(competitors) . . . with very similar products is a reduction in price of only 6%.”125
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There are also cases that with increased competition, pharmaceutical prices actually
went up. For example, the price of Tagamet, a stomach ulcer medication, actually
increased when its first competitor, Zantac, entered the marketplace.126 The prices of
both Tagament and Zantac also increased when additional competitors, Pepcid and
Axid, were introduced.127 In essence, the only effect these drugs had on the market
was market-splitting, as opposed to market expansion.128 From an economic
perspective, follow-on drugs beg the question of excessive market entry. If
competition is monopolistic, it can lead to too much or too little product diversity.129
Usually, excessive market entry is not an issue for consumers. If the market is split
several ways, consumers usually get the benefit of reduced pricing.130 But this
phenomenon does not appear to replicate itself in the pharma market. Follow-on drugs,
for example, bring product diversity. However, they do not bring forth price
reductions. The result? The competitors in the pharma industry continue to have high
economic rewards with comparably little social value or scientific innovation.131 Some
researchers have even gone as far as to conclude that it is not the price of follow-ons
and pioneering medications that are competing, but rather their marketing.132
In situations of legal or de facto monopoly, economic theory predicts that a
monopoly price will be imposed; i.e., the price which the monopolist earns the most
profits.133 This approach was recently vindicated by the United States Supreme Court,
which held that: “the mere possession of monopoly power, and the concomitant
charging of monopoly prices, is not only not unlawful; it is an important element of
the free market system.”134 In the European Union (EU), on the other hand, Article
102(a) of the Treaty for the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) prohibits
conduct by companies that “directly or indirectly impos[e] unfair purchase or selling
prices or other unfair trading conditions.”135 Translated, this not only prohibits prices
that are unreasonably low (“predatory pricing”) but also protects prices that are
unreasonably high.136 In United Brands, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) explained
that a price is abusive if “it has no reasonable relation to the economic value of the
product” and that abuse can be identified through an analysis that considers whether:
(1) the price cost margin is excessive, and (2) the price imposed is either “unfair in
itself or when compared to competing products.”137 This decision created a twopronged test, which is still employed by the ECJ in excessive pricing cases.138
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Given the challenges identified supra, it is unsurprising that excessive pricing is an
area of limited (or even nonexistent) enforcement in the American pharmaceutical
industry. Excessive price regulation is both underdeveloped conceptually and
underused in practice.139

IV. INTERNATIONAL REGULATIONS
Many countries believe that the price of medications should reflect their clinical and
therapeutic value for patients and society. Other countries generally use more than one
set of overlapping methods to establish prices of medications.140 International efforts
to determine the entry price of drugs include free pricing, rate-of-return regulations,
international reference pricing/external price referencing, cost-plus pricing, clinical
and cost-effectiveness pricing.141 Some countries have also set maximum “ceiling”
prices, while others have agreed to arrangements like discounts or rebates based on
volume of sales or payment according to health outcomes.142 These arrangements are
often agreed to on confidential terms between the manufacturer and purchaser.143
Because IP rights are recognized on a territorial basis, each nation has established
its own policy regarding imports.144 There are flexibilities built into the World Trade
Organization’s (WTO) Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS) to overcome patient barriers.145 The TRIPS Agreement set out
minimum standards for the protection of IP, including pharmaceuticals.146 Following
the TRIPS Agreement, there was growing concern and evidence that patent rules might
restrict access to affordable medications for people in developing countries
(particularly for the treatment of HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria).147 This led to
the Doha Declaration (2001), which stated “the [TRIPS] Agreement can and should
be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO members’ right to
protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for all.”148 The
Declaration refers to a number of flexibilities, including the right to compulsory
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licenses.149 It also extends the transition period during which the least-developed
countries do not have to enforce or grant patents to pharmaceuticals.150
Under TRIPS, new drugs may be subject to at least twenty years of patent protection
in all member nations, apart from the flexibilities for the least-developed countries and
a few non-WTO members, such as Somalia.151 Successful AIDS treatment programs,
such as in Brazil or Thailand, were only possible because key pharmaceuticals were
not patent protected and could be produced locally at a much lower cost than
purchasing from the United States.152 For example, when the Brazilian Government
began producing generic AIDS drugs in 2000, prices dropped.153 “The AIDS triple
combination therapy, which costs $10,000 USD per patient a year in industrialized
countries, can now be obtained from Indian generic drugs company, Cipla, for less
than $200 USD per year.”154
Developing countries manufacture their own generic drugs in an effort to make
them more affordable for their citizens. However, they have reported being pressured
by industrialized counties and the multinational pharmaceutical industry not to make
the most of these provisions.155 Even though the Doha Declaration can legally set aside
patents, poorer countries are reluctant to “provok(e) the anger of the United States.”156
For example, when Brazil manufactured generic medications to treat AIDS, the United
States filed a complaint to the WTO to drop the law, and then, to not use it. Brazil was
successful in fighting back, but it is presumed that smaller countries would rather “give
in” than fight.157

A. Caps on Capsules: Prescription from Abroad
Despite differences globally, basically all countries do more than the American
government in curbing pharmaceutical prices.158 In countries with universal health
care, their governments are motivated to help keep prescription drug costs contained
(described here as “profit controls”). Thus, other nations have a lower threshold for
accepting the pervasive drug pricing monopoly like in the United States.
There are several methods foreign nations employ to balance cost-containment and
access to prescription drugs that should be considered stateside. For example, other
countries may utilize a combination of “centralized price negotiations, national
formularies, and comparative and cost-effectiveness research for determining price
ceilings”159—the “cap” on capsules. In addition to direct price controls is another
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method known “external reference pricing” (ERP).160 Under ERP, foreign
governments permit sellers to set the price of pharmaceuticals by how much they are
selling the same product in comparable markets. This would require price
transparency. Additionally, once there is an agreement, some nations, like Canada, for
example, caps the price drug manufacturers can raise it, and it has to align with national
inflation rates.161 Such a stipulation is not present in the American market.
Another method utilized by other countries is not just assessing whether a new drug
is effective, but whether it is (1) more effective than existing therapies, and (2) if it is
cost-effective.162 For example, England’s NICE, mentioned supra for refusing to cover
Avastin, uses a quality of life formula in considering whether to cover certain
medications.163 NICE usually requires “that the cost per quality-adjusted life year
(QALY) remain below 30,000 pounds ($39,000)” as a prerequisite for government
coverage.164 If the drug does not meet criteria, they would negotiate with the company
for discounts and rebates.165 Canada also pays for prescription drugs for its citizens
and utilizes a similar method to the UK. The Canadian government has a quasi-judicial
agency board, the Patented Medicine Prices Review Board, that will refuse to pay for
medications it thinks are too excessive.166 Drug manufacturers must either comply or
be willing to lose the Canadian market.167 Comparatively, research indicates that
Americans consume more expensive drugs than their counterparts in other developed
nations without any evidence of better outcomes.168
Another method is limiting patent protection. Introduced supra in the Lantus case
study, patent protections and FDA marketing exclusivity in the United States,
bolstered with practices like evergreening, contribute to excessive drug prices. Other
countries are not as favorable to the practice. India, for example, prohibits
evergreening.169 Sanofi was also able to take advantage of the USTPO, and filed
seventy-four patents in the U.S. for Lantus, compared with forty-six in all of Europe
and twenty-five in Japan.170 Additionally, “due in part to more friendly biosimilar
regulatory requirements,” Europe and Japan have more competitors for Lantus, two
and three, respectively, compared to the United States’ one.171
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B. Does Cost-Containment Stifle Foreign Innovation?
There is no straight-forward answer to whether cost-containment stifles foreign
innovation. Because the United States has not had price controls on drug prices, it is
impossible to observe the “natural experiment” of how much innovation would be
stifled if both American and foreign drug manufacturers were unable to freely price
their goods in the States to maximize their profits. Sanofi, for example, the French
company that created Lantus, had a profit margin of 29.3% for its shareholders last
year.172 Unsurprisingly, most of that profit was made in the United States.173
It also should be noted that quantifying productivity with Europe versus the United
States is more complicated than at first blush: a drug company’s home base does not
necessarily correlate with where it is developed.174 For example, some foreign
companies develop and manufacture their medications in the United States. Further
complicating comparisons is the number of biosimilars approved in the United States
each year, opening up, yet again, the “what is innovative” debate.
Several international biopharmaceutical companies are highly innovative and
profitable in spite of being based in home countries with universal health care and
profit controls. Switzerland is the home base to Roche and Novartis. AstraZeneca and
GlaxoSmithKline are from England. Ireland has Allergan, Mallinckrodt, and Endo.
Canada has Bausch. Bayer and Fresenius are German. The Netherlands has Mylan,
and Novo Nordisk is located in nearby Denmark. Teva Pharmaceutical is in Israel.
And as mentioned already, Sanofi is French.
These companies were singled out in this Comment because they were forty percent
of the thirty-five pharmaceutical companies examined by Ledley et al. for JAMA.
Researchers compared the profitability of the pharmaceutical industry with other
industries with expensive, upfront research and development costs, like the technology
(e.g., Google, Apple) and materials industries (e.g., 3M).175 Altogether, the thirty-five
pharmaceutical companies had a combined revenue of $11.5 trillion USD and were
almost twice as profitable as the average nonpharmaceutical industry (13.8% versus
7.7%).176 One can infer that to be competitive in the highly technical and regulated
market of pharmaceuticals, these foreign companies have to be innovative.
Nevertheless, the United Kingdom was credited with being the most innovative
European country in 2017 and has 2,066 biopharmaceutical companies. Germany had
the highest amount of European drug patents that year (627) and has 1,201
biopharmaceutical companies.177 There are other examples of countries “with low
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domestic spending on drugs but lots of innovation.”178 Denmark and Israel, homes to
Norvo Nordisk and Teva Pharmaceuticals, respectively, spend relatively little on their
citizens’ health care per capita (“only Costa Rica and Mexico spend less”) but have
“significant biopharma innovation.”179 Switzerland spends second to the United States
on healthcare, but they cap out-of-pocket spending for their citizens (primary care,
specialty care, and prescription drugs altogether are capped at the equivalent of $2,645
USD per adult).180 They also boast 100% insurance coverage for their citizens.
Nevertheless, Switzerland is highly innovative: two of the world’s largest and highly
innovative drug companies, Novartis and Roche, are based there.181 In fact, six of the
forty-eight new drugs approved in 2019 by FDA belonged to Novartis.182 The converse
is also true: Canada, with all of its healthcare protections for its citizens, is towards the
bottom of all innovator countries.183

V.

U.S. REGULATIONS: PROTECTIONS AND LIMITATIONS

Medications are subject to dense regulatory framework. With safety and efficacy
concerns, IP protection, as well as the limited ability of competition enforcement, the
pharmaceutical industry is already highly regulated.184 Nevertheless, different
pharmaceutical markets are subject to different levels of regulation. This section
summarizes current regulations in the American pharmaceutical industry.

A. Current Federal Regulations
While there are currently no laws in the United States controlling pharmaceutical
profits, the pharmaceutical industry argues that advances both in science and drug
development have increased when Congress passed legislation that supports,
promotes, and incentivizes innovation. “In reality, patent law and the exclusivities
offered by FDA often act to inhibit innovation and confound public goals.”185 The
government has also instilled measures to help the pharma industry with the assistance
of federal funding.186 Finally, the Bush Administration effectively limited CMS’
ability to negotiate drug prices with the pharmaceutical companies.187
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These policies include the Orphan Drug Act, the Hatch-Waxman Act, and the
Medicare Modernization Act, among others.188 It should be noted that this section is
not meant to be inclusive of all current federal regulations (this would go beyond the
scope and length of this Comment). Nevertheless, instead of regulating the
pharmaceutical industry, U.S. lawmakers have instead opted to protect the
pharmaceutical industry’s monopolization on innovation and prices through Congress.

1. Orphan Drug Act
The term “Orphan Drugs” refers to medications used in the treatment of rare
diseases and conditions. The United States Orphan Drug Act (ODA) of 1983 is sonamed because it refers specifically to drugs that treat rare diseases and conditions.189
It was amended in 1984 to define rare diseases as those affecting less than 200,000
people in the United States. However, it also includes drugs for diseases affecting over
200,000 people if creating and selling the drug was not commercially viable.190
Development of a medication is not commercially viable unless potential profits dwarf
the cost of research and development. These conditions are considered “commercial
orphans” because the population number of those afflicted with these conditions are
too small to render commercially feasible development.191 The Act was initially
promulgated with good intentions. ODA helped the pharmaceutical industry by
lowering barriers for orphan research and development, and protecting their markets
with exclusivity.192
The major benefit of ODA is that it has been largely credited for the substantial
increase of the creation of drugs for rare diseases. For example, the number of orphan
designations jumped from just one in 1983 (the year the law passed), to forty in 1984,
to ninety-one in 2018.193 ODA helps protect these pioneering drugs from follow-on
imitators.194 One of the most important features of ODA is a seven-year period of
marketing exclusivity for classified drugs for rare diseases. In short, a follow-on drug
without any clinical benefit over an older, pioneer drug with ODA exclusivity will not
be approved for sale in the United States.195 ODA also aids drug developers by making
annual grants available to either companies or academic-based researchers.196 Along
with these grants, these institutions can also enjoy a fifty percent tax credit for the
research and development process.197
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Despite the noble purposes of ODA, the pharmaceutical industry has been
exploiting this loophole. Critics insist drug manufacturers are manipulating the system
and the ODA incentives need to be revisited.198 Absent competition during the initial
seven years of a drug’s orphan classification, manufacturers not only have zero
competition, but they can charge whatever price they want. Further, if the
manufacturer can find another potentially curative effect for a different rare disease,
the company can get another waiver on the same drug, in an endless Groundhog Dayesque cycle.
America’s Health Insurance Plan claims that the pharmaceutical industry has
“gamed the system,” with manufacturers viewing ODA as a way to maximize profits
by turning products that treat a small number of patients into multibillion-dollar
sellers.199 In 2017, Kaiser Health News published an investigation into orphan drug
development. Their analysis suggests that pharma manufacturers milk ODA by having
drugs gain orphan status after they were already approved for another disease.200
FDA officials have stated that before Kaiser’s study was published, they did not
realize how many existing drugs have been repurposed by companies, exploiting the
loophole.201 For example, a drug that can treat one cancer can be approved for multiple
others. Novartis, the manufacturer for Gleevec, an effective cancer treatment for
myeloid leukemia, has been awarded nine “orphan” approvals for other cancer
treatments.202 In contrast, Novartis tried to make the same argument for Gleevec to
justify extending their patent in India. India’s Supreme Court vehemently denied their
request.203
Another example: Humira is a medication to treat rheumatoid arthritis. It is also the
world’s top-selling drug. Its 2016 revenues reached $7.6 billion USD in the third
quarter in the United States and $11.8 billion worldwide. Now, it has achieved “orphan
status” for juvenile arthritis, Crohn’s disease, and more—giving AbbVie, its
manufacturer, market exclusivity until 2023.204 As these facts are laid open, it seems
readily apparent that there needs to be policy reform. As it stands, FDA still insists on
protecting the law.
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2. The Hatch-Waxman Act
The development of generic drugs was largely supported internationally by the
Drug Price Competition and Patent Restoration Act, also known as the Hatch-Waxman
Act, in the United States in 1984. The Act not only defined generic drugs, but it also
approved the methods by which they should be approved and regulated, thereby
creating the generic drug industry as we know it today in the United States.205 Generic
drugs have been the focus in the quest for greater drug affordability, but not without
the concerns that generic drugs could weaken the industry by simply producing a
medication after the major research and development (along with all of the associated
costs) has been finished by the brand name manufacturer.206 Competition between
generic and brand name industries is desirable for patient pockets; however, policies
must maintain a delicate balance to ensure that one market does not dominate and
destroy the other.207
The Hatch-Waxman Act was promulgated in response to Roche Products, Inc. v.
Bolar Pharmaceutical Co.208 Roche owned flurazepam and Bolar was planning on
selling a copy of the drug after Roche’s patents expired.209 Bolar’s plan was to time
their approval to conveniently coincide with the expiration of Roche’s patents. The
essence of Roche’s case was that Bolar was planning on developing and marketing
flurazepam while the drug was still protected under Roche’s patent.210 The issue was
that by doing preparatory efforts while the drug was still protected, Bolar was
effectively infringing on Roche’s patent.211 Roche sued Bolar for patent infringement
and ultimately won.212
From a public policy perspective, this case extended patent protection of the name
brand drug manufacturers. If another manufacturer cannot begin working on a drug
while the developer’s patent is in full force, that means that work on the generic drug
can only begin once the patent expires.213 The approval process following patent
expiration for generic purposes is around two to three years, thereby extending patent
protection. Congress acted quickly after Roche was decided and passed the HatchWaxman Act.214
Broadly speaking, the Hatch-Waxman Act provides incentives for drug companies
to challenge patents owned by innovators while simultaneously giving generics a
research exemption that allows them to develop generic drugs while the branded
patents are still in force—without the added liability of infringement.215 Another
feature of the act was to encourage a race to market by granting the first generic
205
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approval that challenges a patent listed in the “Orange Book” (a patent database of
approved pharmaceuticals) with as much as 180 days of market exclusivity.216 The
generic sponsor will be able to price the drug at a premium during their 180 days.217
This was designed to allow the first filer to earn a substantial return for both their
investment in science, as well as the legal work needed when challenging a patented
medication.218 After the initial 180 days, typically other generic filers enter the
market.219
The Hatch-Waxman Act also contains provisions that are favorable to the drug
innovators. The act gave innovators FDA regulatory inclusivity (usually about five
years for a new product), a period during which FDA will not approve a generic.220
For a number of big drugs, these periods of inclusivity have been worth billions of
dollars.221

3. The Bayh-Dole Act
The Bayh-Dole Act is an unfortunate example of the United States already having
the tools in its arsenal to combat pharmaceutical pricing, but never using them.
Adopted by Congress in 1980, the bipartisan Bayh-Dole Act (the Patent and
Trademark Law Amendments Act) allows institutions and grant recipients, such as
universities, to hold the title to patents on inventions stemming from governmentfunded research. They are then permitted to license the rights to these inventions to
the private sector, who further develop them for commercialization.222
Inventions conceived through federally funded research projects are required to be
reported to the agency that funded the project, like NIH. The Act permits businesses
(large and small) and nonprofits (including universities) to retain ownership of the
inventions created with the assistance of federal funding. In turn, the organizations are
expected to file for patent protection and to ensure commercialization upon licensing
for the benefit of public health.223
Before the Bayh-Dole Act, no drug had been created from federally funded
inventions.224 Since the Bayh-Dole’s inception, federal funding for drug development
has been the new standard. The NIH alone, for example, supported ninety-seven
percent of FDA approved drugs between 2010 and 2016.225 As The Economist notes,
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the Bayh-Dole Act “unlocked all the inventions and discoveries that had been made in
laboratories throughout the United States with the help of taxpayers’ money.”226
What happens to the medications once the private industry starts licensing the
federally funded drugs? The companies price them however they want.227 Congress
intended to guard against such monopolization in the Bayh-Dole Act with a provision
known as “march-in rights.”228 These march-in rights were intended to act as a hard
stop to abuse and ensure that federally funded inventions were being used for the
benefit of the public.229 This was meant to include new medications being “available
to the public on reasonable terms” or where public health or safety needs are not being
satisfied.230 Because up to half of all new medicines in the United States are invented
at universities through taxpayer funding, it seems rational that the public should reap
the benefits of inventions they helped fund.231
How many times has the United States exercised their march-in rights in nearly four
decades? Exactly zero.232 As mentioned supra, American taxpayers are forced to pay
for federally funded pharmaceutical inventions twice: once for the research that the
federal government paid for with taxpayer funds, and again as patients for
monopolized and arbitrarily priced medicines.233
The fact that march-in rights have never been utilized by NIH/HHS means one of
two things: either there have never been any abuses of publicly funded patents during
this time period or that the government does not care enough to make medications
affordable.234 The NIH/HHS has repeatedly denied requests for the exercise of marchin rights because they do not believe that “reasonable terms” includes price
considerations.235 This is not likely to change any time soon, as President Trump swore
in Alex M. Azar II, a senior executive at Eli Lilly for ten years, as the 24th Secretary
of Health and Human Services.236
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4. The Medicare Modernization Act
The United States Congress banned government negotiations on drug price
regulation during the Bush Administration in 2003.237 The Medicare Modernization
Act (MMA) of 2003 established the Medicare Part D benefit.238 The MMA included a
provision, known as the “noninterference” clause, which stipulates that HHS Secretary
“may not interfere with the negotiations between drug manufacturers and
pharmacies . . . and may not require a particular formulary or institute a price structure
for the reimbursement of covered Part D drugs.”239 The provision effectively
prohibited the United States Government from having a direct role in negotiating or
setting drug prices in Medicare Part D.240
The Part D program allows the private insurers who provide prescription drug
coverage to negotiate drug prices.241 The private payors were given the authority to
negotiate for drug prices, establish formularies, and apply utilization management
tools to control costs since Medicare is not allowed to do so. This approach contrasts
with how drug prices are determined in other federal programs, such as the mandatory
drug price rebates in Medicaid and the use of ceiling prices and minimum discounts
employed by the Department of Veterans Affairs242 and the Department of Defense
(they pay about half of retail value for medications).243
Since the inception of the MMA, some lawmakers have continued to press for
legislation that would give the Secretary of HHS authority to negotiate drug prices for
Medicare beneficiaries.244 This policy concept has recently gained more attention in
Congress because Democrats, who have historically been the strongest supporters of
pharmaceutical price control regulation, now hold a majority in the United States
House of Representatives. Ninety-two percent of Americans are in favor of letting the
government negotiate drug prices for Medicare beneficiaries.245 This move would
mirror centralized pricing methods utilized in Europe.246 As of this writing, the Trump
Administration has not proposed any change in law nor taken a position on the
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congressional proposals to allow the government to negotiate drug prices. However,
President Donald Trump expressed support for the idea prior to taking office.247

B. Proposed Federal Legislation
Regulating pharmaceutical pricing is of concern to elected representatives. Instead
of outright price controls, two senators introduced a bill in the summer of 2019
targeting manufacturers who use public funds in the creation of NMEs.

1. We PAID Act
Two United States senators, Chris Van Hollen (D-Md) and Rick Scott (R-Fla),
introduced bipartisan legislation to address the “skyrocketing” costs of drugs on July
31, 2019.248 The We Protect American Investment in Drugs (We PAID) Act was
created to ensure that prices of drugs developed using federal funds are set at
“reasonable” levels.249 Because taxpayers pay for the funding, the two senators argue
(and as explained further supra), they should also be able to afford these drugs.250
If enacted, this act would allow the National Academy of Medicine to determine
what is a reasonable price for a drug and to consider factors such as federal investment,
affordability, research and development costs, the market for the drug, international
and domestic sales, and public payer expenditures.251 The act would also establish an
independent committee, the Drug Affordability and Access Committee, to determine
the price based on the National Academy of Medicine’s study.252 The manufacturers
would have to enter licensing agreements with the government to ensure price
control.253 The two senators are hopeful that their bill will have momentum.

C. State Legislation
Reducing the cost of prescription drugs is a small subset of issues that members of
the House, Senate, and White House are interested in pursuing. Whether they can
collectively agree on a policy solution is an entirely different matter. One tactic that
some of the individual states are trying to induce is increased transparency. Because
the United States is a multi-payor landscape, the actual prices of medications vary
widely.254 Their undisclosed discounts remain confidential (see MMA, supra), and
ultimately, the general public has very little insight into the actual prices. States like
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California, Nevada, Maryland, and New York are all implementing legislation that
seeks to provide transparency in prescription drug prices.255
In October 2017, California signed into law SB 17.256 It requires drug manufacturers
to notify purchasers at least sixty days before increasing the list price of a prescription
drug by more than sixteen percent in a two-year period.257 All drugs with a Wholesale
Acquisition Cost or that cost more than $40.00 USD for a thirty-day supply will be
subjected to the new legislation.258 Meanwhile, health plans and insurers must selfdisclose information that will be compiled in a consumer-friendly report highlighting
the overall effects of drug costs on healthcare premiums. Vermont also has a drug
transparency law (S.216). This law requires drug manufacturers to justify price
increases exceeding fifty percent over five years or fifteen percent in a single year—if
they place a substantial burden on the state—to the Attorney General’s Office. They
could face fines up to $10,000 USD if they fail to do so.259
Maryland approved a new “price gouging” law (HB 631) targeted towards essential
generic and off-patent products that would cap prices for certain medications.260
Maryland’s law goes one step further than most transparency laws. Maryland’s
provisions essentially cap annual price increases to below fifty percent. This strategy
likely would have been considered far too controversial for approval in the United
States a few years earlier. Thanks to the pharmaceutical pricing landscapes’ significant
events during the past few years, public opinion of the industry has been markedly
affected.261
It may not be surprising that the generic drugs trade association, Association for
Accessible Medications (AAM), filed a lawsuit challenging the law’s
constitutionality.262 First, AAM alleged that HB 631 violates the Commerce Clause of
the United States Constitution. The Commerce Clause governs interstate commerce
occurring between the states, thereby making it within the federal government’s
domain. The AAM was found to have standing because the law regulates commerce
inside and outside of Maryland.263
AAM made their constitutional challenge based on several points. First, they argued
that HB 631 specifically targeted transactions between pharmaceutical manufactures
and wholesale distributors or retail pharmacy chains with centralized warehouses,
none of which are in Maryland.264 Furthermore, AAM alleged that pricing
determinations were made on a national basis, and not within the state of Maryland.265
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AAM stated that “next to none of the largest drug manufacturers . . . reside in
Maryland.”266 AAM went on to argue that price restraints imposed by HB 631 would
“inevitably affect commercial transactions, pricing, and commerce in other states.”267
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with AAM’s argument and found that
HB631 directly regulates transactions that take place outside Maryland.268 The State
of Maryland sought a writ of certiorari, concerned that this case sets “a precedent that
would deprive a state of power to protect consumers from predatory commercial
practices that originate out of state, even though they are directed into the state and
will directly harm its citizens.”269 The writ was denied.270

VI. CAPPED CAPSULES: POTENTIAL REPERCUSSIONS
If the United States were to curb the profit motive for pharmaceutical manufacturers
through the myriad of options already in place overseas (i.e., limiting evergreening to
measurable formulary changes, negotiating prices, capping the amount a medication’s
price can be raised in a given year, refusing to allow Medicare to reimburse expensive,
low benefit medications, etc.), it would be naïve to think there would not be any
consequences. For one, it’s estimated that global profits would decrease by $134
billion USD.271 It is also worth mentioning that price increases do not change the
quantities ordered or manufacturing price; increased prices are strictly attributed to
profits.272
Professor and economist Darren Filson describes a potential parade of horribles if
the U.S. adopted European-like price controls. In a study partially funded by Pfizer,
he asserts that drug corporations would fall in value by thirty-five percent, and the
output of NMEs would decrease by forty percent to the detriment of consumer
welfare.273 As profit motives are decreased, drug companies may focus their attentions
more on the potentiality of a drug’s profit for rare diseases rather than its applicable
use in more common, and less profitable, disease prevention and treatment274
(however, there are salient arguments discussed supra that this is already the case).
Currently, manufacturers at home and abroad make most of their profits in the
United States. The brunt of this burden is felt by Americans more than in other wealthy
countries because many Americans remained uninsured or underinsured. Even those
with insurance have fewer protections when compared with other countries. The CEO
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of French pharma company Genfit admitted “that the U.S. has been subsidizing
innovation for the rest of the world.”275 Currently, other governments “get the best
deal they can” from drug manufacturers because they can make up the difference from
Americans.276
Because the U.S. government (mostly) stays out of price negotiations (current drug
price negotiations are mainly between private insurers and the manufacturers), it
would be a stark contrast if the government took the front seat. Say, for example, that
the government decided to use Medicare bargaining power (it could be in a variety of
forms, like refusing to reimburse for certain drugs that are not cost-effective, negotiate
prices for vital medications like Lantus, or cap out of pocket spending for recipients),
the drug industry may be forced to make profits elsewhere. Their negotiations in other
countries may look different if the drug companies could not rely on making the bulk
of their profits in the United States anymore and may end up raising their prices
abroad.
Some researchers suggest that if prices in Europe increased, so would their
innovation. With increased ability to make a profit, drug makers might be more
incentivized to take the inherent risks involved in creating NMEs. Economists from
the University of Southern California purport that if Europeans increased their drug
prices just by twenty percent, it “would result in substantially more drug discovery
worldwide,” causing societal benefits that would have a global impact.277 Europeans’
lives—as well as those globally—may also be better for additional formularies.278
Researchers concluded for every $2.5 billion of revenue, one NME could be
produced.279
There is more to innovation than solely relying on profits. As mentioned supra, the
United States has other methods in place to promote innovation aside from
uncontrolled drug pricing, such as federally funded research, a strong patent system,
and assistance from academia.280

VII. CONCLUSION
Americans pay more for their medications than anywhere else on the planet.281 Yet,
despite its innovations and wealth, the United States has some of the worst healthcare
outcomes of any other developed nation.282 Pharmaceutical prices were not regulated
by the federal United States government in the hopes that the industry would selfbalance and self-correct as the market has for many other consumer goods. The
275

Dearment, supra note 10.

276

White, supra note 166.

277

Goldman & Lakdawalla, supra note 272.

278

Id.

279

Pierre Dubois, Olivier de Mouzon, Fiona Scott-Morton & Paul Seabright, Market Size and
Pharmaceutical Innovation, 43 RAND J. ECON. 844 (Oct. 26, 2015), https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/fu
ll/10.1111/1756-2171.12113 [https://perma.cc/77AC-WJ8V].
280

Dearment, supra note 10.

281

Belk, supra note 12.

282

Nisha Kurani, Daniel McDermott & Nicolas Shanosky, How Does the Quality of the US
Healthcare System Compare to Other Countries?, PETERSON-KFF: HEALTH SYSTEM TRACKER (Aug. 20,
2020),
https://www.healthsystemtracker.org/chart-collection/quality-u-s-healthcare-system-comparecountries/#item-start

2020

CAPS ON CAPSULES

309

problem, as judge and Republican Party Vice Chairman, Alex Kim, eloquently put it,
“In a free market, everyone just does what’s best for themselves.”283 Like modern-day
conquistadors hoping to find gold in the new world, foreign drug manufacturers also
reap the bulk of their profits in the United States. The pharma industry is not an
altruistic one. It is a business. And because American taxes help fund the research for
these drugs without ensuring universal access to them, the government should do more
to regulate the industry to make pharmaceuticals more affordable.
The first concern is the circumstantial evidence of HHS’ agency capture by the
pharmaceutical industry. Almost a personification of this phenomenon is Secretary
Azar. Prior to being a senior executive and CEO of Eli Lilly, he was an HHS
attorney.284 However, during his subsequent tenure at Eli Lilly, the price of insulin
nearly doubled while he was CEO.285 Now, as HHS Secretary, instead of regulating
the industry at home, he has suggested that Americans should import their medications
from Canada.286 Without even having to make further policy changes, HHS already
has march-in rights that it has never utilized. The MMA should also be repealed. Most
Americans (ninety-two percent) already support the idea that Medicare should
negotiate drug prices, like the large, public payors in other countries do.287
CMS should also institute a cost-benefit analysis when deciding whether or not to
reimburse medications with little clinical value. This would also incentivize pharma
to create drugs with greater efficacy, rather than focusing on the ones with the greatest
price point. European-style profit controls should also be considered, including a
mandate that the pharmaceutical companies reinvest a certain percentage of their
profits back into research and development rather than utilize public funding. A great
deal of pharmaceutical spending is on marketing, which should also be curbed. Drugs
should not be advertised on television, directing consumers to ask their physicians
about them.288 This completely undermines the role physicians have in their decisionmaking and infringes upon the corporate practice of medicine. Further, still, is the
connection between marketing and the prescribing rates of drugs. For example,
between 2015 and 2017, pharmaceutical companies spent $39.7 million USD alone on
opioid marketing. Researchers discovered the disturbing correlation between opioid
marketing to physicians and patient deaths from overdoses.289
Proposed state legislation is promising. Drug companies should explain their
rationale for drug increases, like the fifteen percent increase in an annual year
mandated in Vermont to enhance market transparency. Price increases should stay
aligned with national inflation rates versus arbitrary increases with little or no warning.
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While price regulation seems oppositional to the American free market system, it
highlights another very American concept: choice. It’s the choice between taking
insulin as prescribed, or rationing a drug as essential to life as oxygen. Following price
gouging by the pharmaceutical industry, the choice was already made for many
Americans. Only after an overhaul of existing policies can prices be comparable to
what other developed countries pay for their prescriptions. Once these means are
accomplished, Americans can more freely appreciate the pharmaceutical industry’s
research and innovation as opposed to being victimized by it.

